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Introduction
At the time of compiling these projections for 2009 and 
2010, the world economy is going through a recession of 
unprecedented severity in post-war history. The financial 
crisis, the first signs of which emerged in the United States 
in 2007, took a serious turn for the worse during the 
autumn of 2008. It hit all the markets, with investors’ 
mistrust  in  banking  institutions  leading  them,  just  like 
enterprises  and  households,  to  increasingly  show  their 
preference for security and liquidity. These developments 
on the financial markets did not spare the real economy 
either, since a large proportion of industrial activity and, 
consequently, of business-related services too, was sud-
denly paralysed from the fourth quarter of 2008 onwards. 
Through the channel of international trade, this phenom-
enon spread very rapidly to all the developed economies 
– in particular the euro area, which has a high degree of 
openness – and to the emerging economies.
The  release  of  statistics  made  it  possible  to  gradually 
gauge the extent of the drop in GDP at the end of 2008 
and  in  the  first  quarter  of  2009,  which  was  unprec-
edented in speed and scope. It turned out to be consider-
ably more dramatic than had originally been expected. 
Consequently,  week  after  week  from  autumn  2008 
onwards,  economic  forecasts  were  revised  downwards 
sharply.  This  was  particularly  the  case  for  Eurosystem 
and ECB projections for the euro area, and those of the 
Bank for Belgium. Departing from its quarterly publica-
tion schedule, the Bank presented interim projections in 
February 2009, which pointed to a fall in GDP of 1.9 p.c. 
in 2009, as the forecasts that had been published two 
months earlier in the December 2008 Economic Review 
were by then already out of date. Now it seems that these 
interim forecasts further underestimated the extent of the 
deterioration in the economy.
The authorities swiftly took resolute action on both the 
monetary and fiscal fronts in order to prevent the finan-
cial sector from collapsing and to cushion the effects of 
the  recession.  Some  signals,  notably  from  the  financial 
markets and from the indicators compiled from business 
surveys, point more to a stabilisation of the factors that 
had triggered the crisis than to any clear turnaround in 
demand  prospects.  Indeed,  at  the  same  time,  there  is 
still a great deal of financial tension, and the scale of the 
recession will necessitate heavy adjustments in the areas 
of employment, investment and the banking institutions’ 
own  positions.  According  to  these  projections,  these 
adjustments could delay the economic recovery until 2010 
and then further restrain it.
It is against this rather depressed and uncertain backdrop 
that the 2009-2010 economic projections for Belgium are 
presented in this article. The first chapter gives a broad 
overview of recent developments and prospects for the 
international environment, as well as the results for the 
euro area of the Eurosystem central banks’ projections. 
The technical assumptions made in the framework of this 
joint exercise are presented in a box. Chapter 2 sets out 
the results for economic activity, employment and demand 
components in Belgium, while chapter 3 deals with infla-
tion and changes in labour costs. Chapter 4 then focuses 
on general government sector accounts. In this respect, 
it should be recalled that the public finance figures have 
been compiled taking account only of measures that have 
been formally decided by the authorities, in the context 
of  the  fiscal  stimulus  packages,  for  instance.  Besides, 
they depend on more recent outcomes, on changes in 
expenditure based on an assessment of historical trends 
and  on  the  endogenous  effect  of  the  macroeconomic 
environment. Finally, the last chapter analyses the main 
risk factors likely to affect these projections, and sums up 
the findings of the other institutions.
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The projections were closed on the basis of information 
available as at 20 May 2009.
1.  International environment
1.1  The global economy
By the end of 2008, the international financial crisis had 
turned  into  a  widespread  economic  recession,  unprec-
edented in post-war history in terms of severity and the 
extent to which it spread. International trade collapsed 
at the end of last year and at the beginning of this year, 
causing  the  economic  crisis  to  spread  and  giving  it  a 
highly synchronised character.
The United States and the euro area had already entered 
into  recession  during  the  course  of  2008.  The  decline 
in activity was particularly marked in the fourth quarter, 
reaching respectively 1.6 and 1.8 p.c. compared with the 
previous quarter. In the United States, the continued cor-
rection of the residential property market, negative wealth 
effects, stricter borrowing conditions and the deteriora-
tion of the labour market weighed heavily on domestic 
demand. In the euro area, private consumption held up 
better,  but  investment  was  badly  affected  and  exports 
collapsed at the end of the year.
The  rest  of  the  world  has  also  been  heavily  hit  by  the 
collapse of international trade, so this is a major channel 
through which the economic crisis has spread throughout 
the world. The Japanese economy sank ever deeper into 
recession at the end of 2008, while the emerging econo-
mies and the developing countries were increasingly badly 
affected by the crisis. In this respect, the growing interna-
tional  integration  of  production  processes  observed  over 
the last few decades, which has helped boost the volume of 
trade much more than the value of final production, ampli-
fied the effect of falling demand on export markets. This 
aggravated the decline in exports from some of the emerg-
ing economies in Asia, and in particular in China, a country 
which  plays  a  vital  role  in  the  Asian  production  chain. 
Moreover, the growing shortage of trade finance may also 
have reinforced the downward trend in trade flows.
As well as being adversely hit by the significant decline 
in  international  trade,  some  emerging  economies,  par-
ticularly in central and eastern Europe, were also exposed 
to the effect of the sudden turnaround in international 
investor sentiment, which led to financing flows towards 
these economies largely drying up against a backdrop of 
increased risk aversion. And countries like Russia whose 
economy is strongly dependent on exports of oil or other 
raw materials, had to cope with the impact of falling com-
modity prices.
The deterioration of the global economic situation resulted 
in a significant weakening in demand for commodities in 
the second half of 2008 and, consequently, a sharp reduc-
tion in their prices. Thus, oil prices, which had reached 
a peak of 145.7 dollars a barrel of Brent in July 2008, 
stood at around 40 dollars at the end of December, cor-
responding to a drop of around 70 p.c. Prices of other 
commodities also came down over this period, albeit to 
a lesser extent with a decline of around 40 p.c. The fall 
in commodity prices brought with it a positive effect in 
that  inflation  came  down  considerably  from  mid-2008 
onwards, notably in the advanced economies, something 
which was beneficial for households’ purchasing power.
Labour markets have deteriorated significantly in recent 
months. Job creation in major advanced economies has 
been affected in construction and in industry, in an envi-
ronment marked by a decline in trade in goods and by a 
sharp drop in industrial production.
The international financial crisis, which intensified in the 
second half of 2008, and the marked deterioration in the 
economic  situation  prompted  a  rapid  economic  policy 
response, based on past experience. Thanks to vigorous 
capital injections, governments were able to prevent the 
international  financial  system  from  collapsing  and  man-
aged to stabilise the financial markets. Monetary policy-
makers  relaxed  their  monetary  policy  considerably.  The 
US  Federal  Reserve  continued  its  move  towards  lower 
interest rates and cut its target for the federal funds rate 
to within a range from 0 to 0.25 p.c. in December 2008, 
while the Bank of Japan reduced its key interest rate in 
stages to 0.1 p.c. The ECB brought its own central rate 
down to 1 p.c. in May 2009, when it was still as high as 
4.25 p.c. at the beginning of October 2008. Furthermore, 
the central banks took various measures – sometimes non-
standard – and resorted to a wide range of policy instru-
ments with a view to ensuring ample supply of liquidity 
and shore up the financial markets. In addition, govern-
ments announced a wave of ambitious fiscal measures to 
stimulate the economy. In the United States, for instance, 
the  measures  that  were  adopted  under  the  Emergency 
Economic  Stabilization  Act,  the  American  Recovery  and 
Reinvestment Act and the Financial Stability Plan, among 
others, aim to put the financial sector on a sounder foot-
ing, stabilise the property market and support the labour 
market. In line with the European Economic Recovery Plan 
approved  at  the  December  2008  summit,  the  Member 
States of the European Union took important initiatives 
to boost domestic demand and safeguard jobs. On the 
international front, the G-20 drew up an extensive action 9
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YIELD DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN CORPORATE BONDS
AND BENCHMARK GOVERNMENT BONDS
(basis points)
AAA rating BBB rating
STOCK MARKET PRICES
(indexes 2000 = 100)
US (3)
Emerging countries (5) (right-hand scale)
Japan (4)
(left-hand scale)
Commodities excluding energy (index 2000 = 100, 
in US dollars) (left-hand scale)
Brent (in US dollars per barrel) (right-hand scale)
COMMODITY PRICES
EURO EXCHANGE RATE
Exchange rate of the euro against the US dollar
(left-hand scale)
Nominal effective exchange rate 
(index 2000 = 100) (right-hand scale)
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND BALTIC DRY INDEX
(changes compared with the same period of 
the previous year)
International trade (average of imports and exports) 
(left-hand scale)
Baltic Dry index (right-hand scale)
Euro area (2)
CHART 1  DEVELOPMENTS ON THE FINANCIAL AND COMMODITY MARKETS AND IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
  (monthly averages)
Sources : Bloomberg, CPB, HWWI, Thomson Financial Datastream.
(1)  Fixed rate paid by the counterparty of a interest rate swaps receiving the overnight rate for a three months term (Eonia for the euro area, effective federal funds rate 
for the United States).
(2)  Dow Jones Euro Stoxx Broad index.
(3)  Wilshire 5000 index.
(4)  Topix index.
(5)  MSCI Emerging Markets index.10
programme designed to facilitate a sustainable return to 
financial stability and establish an appropriate framework 
for the recovery of economic activity worldwide, including 
by strengthening financial regulation, through better inter-
national coordination of economic policies and by reject-
ing protectionism. It was agreed to triple the International 
Monetary Fund’s lending capacity, by raising it to 750 bil-
lion dollars, and to back a new allocation of special draw-
ing rights, of 250 billion dollars, to make it easier for the 
Fund to help countries to brave the financial crisis.
The financial markets progressively stabilised in the early 
months of 2009. The extreme risk aversion and the ten-
sions  on  the  interbank  market  gradually  eased  –  even 
though the latter is still not functioning normally –, while 
signs  of  investor  confidence  returning  appeared  from 
March onwards. However, the situation on the financial 
markets remains fragile and bank lending to households 
and enterprises continues to slow down.
Besides  the  developments  observed  on  the  financial 
markets, global economic activity, international trade and 
confidence indicators further deteriorated or remained at 
all-time lows, which shows that the economic recession 
is continuing. In the United States, provisional estimates 
point to a drop in GDP of 1.5 p.c. in the first quarter of 
2009. In the euro area, the reduction in activity is esti-
mated at 2.5 p.c. Furthermore, in Japan, the economic 
situation worsened further during the first few months of 
the year, while, in China, activity has barely expanded on 
a quarterly basis.
However,  some  signs  of  improvement  are  gradually 
beginning  to  emerge,  here  and  there.  In  this  respect, 
international trade does no longer appear to be shrink-
ing  at  such  a  high  pace.  In  the  United  States,  private 
consumption has picked up somewhat in the first quarter 
of  2009,  and  some  encouraging  signals  are  emerging 
on the residential property market. In the euro area, the 
confidence indicators recovered in April and May from a 
historically low level. In China, faltering signs suggest that 
economic activity could regain momentum over the next 
few quarters. Commodity prices also started to rise at the 
end of the first quarter, although partly on account of a 
reduction in oil production. Overall, these positive signals 
nevertheless  remain  patchy  and  hardly  alter  the  global 
picture depicting persistent sluggishness of activity, which 
shows up widely through the economic indicators.
Consequently, the forecasts for the year 2009 as a whole 
remain bleak. The sharp reduction in activity in the final 
quarter of 2008 and the first three months of 2009 will 
already  be  weighing  heavily  on  the  year-on-year  eco-
nomic growth rate in 2009. Moreover, the prospect of 
a  prolonged  weakness  of  demand,  excess  production 
capacity throughout the world, the continued correction 
on the residential property markets, persistently strict bor-
rowing conditions and the continued vulnerability of the 
financial system are all factors that will keep economic 
activity in check during the course of 2009.
On  the  other  hand,  the  rapid  decline  in  inflation  over 
the year 2009 and the subsequent improvement in real 
disposable income of households should bolster private 
consumption.  In  addition,  the  wide-ranging  economic 
stimulus measures should have an effect on production. 
But the situation on the labour market, which usually fol-
lows trends in economic activity with a certain time lag, 
is likely to get considerably worse, and this in turn will 
dampen private consumption.
Overall, global GDP is expected to drop by almost 1.5 p.c. 
in 2009, according to the latest forecasts drawn up by 
various  international  organisations.  Trade  in  goods  and 
services is projected to fall back dramatically, by around 
11 p.c. compared with 2008, and is therefore likely to 
remain the principal channel via which the economic crisis 
is spreading throughout the world.
Negative GDP growth of almost 3 p.c. is forecast in the 
United States. Despite some signs of improvement, the 
situation is still worrying in the residential building sector. 
Private consumption is expected to remain sluggish, not 
only  because  of  the  impact  of  heavy  losses  of  wealth 
incurred in 2008, but also because of the sharp deteriora-
tion of the situation on the labour market predicted for 
2009. Investment and exports are also projected to drop 
substantially. In Japan, economic activity is expected to 
slow down even more markedly, falling by just over 5 p.c. 
according to the EC’s Spring forecasts. In 2009, this coun-
try is expected to be faced once again with a situation of 
deflation, in a context of steeply declining exports and 
investment.  For  China,  on  the  other  hand,  projections 
point to a continued rise in GDP, of a little more than 
6 p.c. The expansion of economic activity in China, as well 
as in India, thus, is a major exception to the general trend 
of declining activity. Growth projections for China never-
theless also imply a marked slowdown compared with the 
previous years, exports from this countries being to a large 
extent penalised by the weakening of international trade.
Overall,  the  economic  slowdown  is  gradually  expected 
to decelerate during the course of 2009 and global eco-
nomic growth should pick up in 2010. On account of a 
supportive macroeconomic policy, progressively less strict 
financial  conditions,  stabilisation  of  residential  property 
markets and a recovery of international trade, especially 
in the emerging economies, world GDP should expand 11
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Table  1  Projections for the main economic regions excluding the euro area













World   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 –1.4 1.9
of which :
United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 –2.9 0.9
Japan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.7 –5.3 0.1
United Kingdom   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 –3.8 0.1
China  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.0 6.1 7.8
India  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 4.3 5.0
Russia   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 –3.8 1.5
Brazil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 –1.4 2.2
p.m. Global imports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 –10.6 0.9
inflation  (1)
United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 –0.7 0.3
Japan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 –1.0 –0.5
United Kingdom   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 1.0 1.3
unemployment rate  (2)
United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 8.9 10.2
Japan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 5.8 6.3
United Kingdom   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 8.2 9.4
Source : EC (Spring forecasts, May 2009).
(1)  Consumer price index.
(2)  Percentages of the labour force.
 
once again by nearly 2 p.c. in 2010. Nevertheless, devel-
opments on the financial markets and general economic 
conditions remain highly uncertain.
1.2  Eurosystem projections for the euro area
Already substantially weakened by the financial tensions 
and, in some countries, by the marked deterioration of 
the  property  market,  the  euro  area  was  hit  directly  by 
the repercussions of the synchronised collapse in demand 
from  most  of  its  trading  partners,  at  the  end  of  2008 
and at the beginning of 2009. After having slipped back 
slightly  during  the  two  previous  quarters,  GDP  fell  by 
1.8 p.c. in the fourth quarter of 2008 and by 2.5 p.c. in 
the first three months of 2009. At the same time, infla-
tion has fallen back from 4 p.c. in July 2008 to 0.6 p.c. in 
April 2009, mainly on account of the drop in commodity 
prices  (1).
The unexpected magnitude of these movements led to a 
major revision of growth and inflation forecasts, not only 
in  comparison  with  the  Eurosystem  projection  exercise 
published in December 2008, but also, as far as economic 
activity is concerned, with the ECB’s interim projections 
issued in March 2009. Overall, after having shown a small 
increase of 0.6 p.c. in 2008, real GDP is expected to fall 
by between 5.1 and 4.1 p.c. in 2009. In 2010, growth is 
likely to range between –1 and 0.4 p.c. Inflation is fore-
cast to drop from 3.3 p.c. on average in 2008 to a rate 
between 0.1 and 0.5 p.c. in 2009 and between 0.6 and 
1.4 p.c. in 2010.
Against the backdrop of generalised recession, persistently 
tight borrowing conditions and low levels of business and 
consumer confidence, the euro area is thus confronted 
(1)    According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, inflation stood at 0 p.c. in May12
Table  2  EurosystEm projEctions


















Inflation (HICP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 0.1 /     0.5 0.6 /   1.4 4.5 0.1 1.3
GDP in volume  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 –5.1 /   –4.1 –1.0 /   0.4 1.0 –3.5 –0.2
of which :
Private consumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –1.3 /   –0.5 –1.1 /   0.3 0.8 –0.9 0.2
Public consumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 1.4 /     2.0 0.9 /   1.7 2.1 1.2 1.8
Investment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.3 –12.3 / –10.1 –6.1 / –2.1 5.1 –5.2 –2.7
Exports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 –16.6 / –14.0 –2.0 /   1.0 2.1 –16.0 –2.3
Imports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 –13.8 / –11.2 –3.0 /   1.4 3.3 –14.9 –2.0
Sources : ECB, NBB.
 
Box 1  –  Eurosystem assumptions
The Eurosystem’s economic projections for the euro area, and the Bank’s corresponding forecasts for Belgium are 
based on the following technical assumptions :
–    the interest rates are based on market expectations. As an annual average, three-month interbank deposit 
rates in euro are expected to come down from 4.6 p.c. in 2008 to 1.4 p.c. in 2009, and then rise again to 
1.6 p.c. in 2010. This trend assumes a normalisation of spreads in relation to the ECB’s key interest rate and 
the overnight money market rate, which had emerged on account of the financial tensions. Rates on ten-year 
Belgian government bonds are estimated at 4.4 p.c. in 2008, 4.1 p.c. in 2009 and expected to rise to 4.5 p.c. 
in 2010. Compared to these reference rates, the assumptions also include a supplementary increase in the cost 
of financing corporate and household investment of respectively some 10 and 30 basis points ;
–    the bilateral euro exchange rates are kept constant at their value as at mid-May 2009, namely 1.34 US dollar 
to the euro ;
–    in accordance with the movement in implicit prices reflected in forward contracts, international market prices 
for a barrel of Brent are expected to average 54.5 dollars in 2009 and 65.5 dollars in 2010, against 97.7 dollars 
in 2008 ;
with  the  prospect  of  an  extended  period  of  economic 
sluggishness. On the demand side, exports – and along 
with  them  investment  too  –  should  decline  sharply  in 
2009.  Private  consumption  is  also  expected  to  drop  in 
2009 and is likely to remain weak in 2010. Purchasing 
power should of course be boosted temporarily by the 
slowdown  in  inflation,  but  increasingly  bleak  income 
prospects and capital losses sustained on both financial 
and property assets are likely to encourage households 
to  rein  in  their  expenditure.  In  particular,  adjustments 
that companies are having to make in terms of jobs are 
likely to continue in 2010, leading to an increase in the 
unemployment rate over the whole period covered by the 
projections.
The  recent  slowdown  in  inflation  is  also  expected  to 
continue in the short run. Inflation is even likely to be 
negative for a few months, on account of significant base 
effects related to the high oil prices a year before. Since 
this only has a temporary impact, inflation is expected to 
return to positive figures at the end of 2009 and in 2010. 
It is nevertheless likely to remain low, in the absence of 
wage pressure, against a backdrop of persistently weak 
economic activity and the worsening employment market.
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–    in 2008, Belgium’s export markets, measured as the weighted total of the volume of imports of the trading partners, 
including those in the euro area, only expanded by 2.3 p.c., while they had posted an annual average growth rate 
of close to 7 p.c. over the five previous years. They are likely to shrink by 11.3 p.c. in 2009, owing to the collapse 































































CRUDE OIL PRICE (1)
(monthly averages, barrel of Brent)
In euro Three-month interbank rates in euro
INTEREST RATES (2)
(quarterly averages)
Ten-year yield on Belgian bonds
ASSUMPTIONS WITH REGARD TO CRUDE OIL PRICE AND INTEREST RATE
Source : ECB.
(1)  Actual figures up to April 2009, assumption from May 2009.
(2)  Actual figures up to the first quarter of 2009, assumption from the second quarter of 2009.









Three-month interbank rates in euro  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 1.4 1.6
Ten-year Belgian government bond yields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 4.1 4.5
Euro exchange rate against the US dollar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.47 1.33 1.34
Oil price (US dollar per barrel)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97.7 54.5 65.5
(percentage changes)
Export markets relevant to Belgium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 –11.3 0.2




–    the export prices of competitors are forecast to fall by 2.6 p.c. in 2009 and by 0.3 p.c. in 2009 ;
–    as is usual according to Eurosystem conventions, the figures for public finances are calculated taking account 
of the macroeconomic environment and measures which have already been announced and are specified in 
sufficient detail.
2.  Activity, employment and demand in 
Belgium
2.1  Activity and employment trends
The slump in the euro area at the end of 2008 and at 
beginning of 2009 hit economic activity in Belgium head 
on. Both industrial production and foreign trade in goods 
plummeted from October 2008 onwards, their year-on-
year decline reaching around 15 p.c. in February 2009. 
Industrial production had by then fallen back to its level 
of 2002. More broadly speaking, the downswing in the 
economy also affected the transport and business-related 
services branches of activity, in the wake of the deteriorat-
ing business climate and efforts undertaken by enterprises 
to cut back their operating costs, as well as trade and 
hotels and restaurants, reflecting consumer restraint in a 
highly uncertain economic outlook.
Overall, real GDP fell back by 1.7 p.c. in the fourth quarter 
of 2008, then by a further 1.6 p.c. in the first quarter of 
2009, a pace of economic contraction not seen since the 
Second World War. The extent of the fall in the the Bank’s 
synthetic  business  indicator  between  September  2008 
and March 2009 and the decline in the rate of produc-
tion  capacity  utilisation  in  the  manufacturing  industry 
– from 82.4 p.c. in October 2008 to 70.1 p.c. in April 
2009 – also bear witness to the unprecedented abrupt-
ness of the drop in economic activity. While the business 
indicators have been showing some signs of stabilisation 
of in Belgium since April, as in other countries, the level 
of these indicators points to more negative growth in the 
short term, albeit less marked than in the two previous 
quarters.
Even though these projections tend to be based on the 
assumption of a gradual easing of the financial tensions 
and strengthening of the global economy, the changes 
that still need to be made by financial institutions to get 
back on a firm footing and, more generally, the adjust-
ments in terms of investment and employment that the 
economic recession will trigger within enterprises should 
continue  to  restrain  the  upturn  in  economic  growth. 
This  recovery  is  not  expected  until  the  beginning  of 
2010, and then only on a limited scale. In annual aver-
age terms, after having grown by 1 p.c. in 2008, GDP is 
expected to contract by 3.5 p.c. in 2009 and by 0.2 p.c.   
in 2010.
In the face of the sudden drastic cutback in a large part 
of economic activity at the turn of this year, enterprises 
reacted  first  and  foremost  by  activating  the  flexibility 
levers in the use of labour. In 2008, they cut back on 
temporary work, among both white-collar and blue-collar 
staff, although to a larger extent for the latter. For this cat-
egory of workers, they also resorted much more widely to 
temporary lay-offs for economic reasons. In March 2009, 
the NEO – the public office responsible for paying out the 
allowance compensating for the loss of income during 
the period of inactivity – recorded around 313,000 per-
sons concerned by this scheme, out of a potential total 
of  1.3  million  bluecollar  workers  in  Belgium.  In  April, 
the  number  of  temporary  unemployed  fell  by  almost 
100,000  units  from  the  previous  month’s  peak,  largely 
for seasonal reasons. However, the year-on-year rise still 
comes to more than 75 p.c.
By reducing the volume of labour while preserving staff-
ing levels in enterprises, this measure implicitly cuts the 
average number of hours worked per employee. Initially, 
it  enables  hourly  productivity  to  be  maintained  within 
firms and helps curb the rise in unemployment. Thus, in 
Belgium, the harmonised unemployment rate remained 
stable, hovering around 7 p.c., until the first quarter of 
2009, whereas there was already an upward trend in the 
number of jobless within the euro area as a whole. As 
part of the wider economic stimulus measures, the gov-
ernment decided in late April 2009 to set up a temporary 
scheme for suspending execution of the employment con-
tract for white-collar workers. This measure will run from 
1 July to 31 December 2009, although this period may be 
extended until mid-2010 following an opinion from the 
National Employment Council. Its implementation at firm 
level is subject to conditions, notably as regards the extent 
of the drop in activity justifying the measure.15











































































































































































GDP in volume 
(year-on-year changes) (left-hand scale)




(index 2002 = 100) (left-hand scale)
Rate of production capacity utilisation 
(right-hand scale)
Exports (volume index, base year 2002 = 100)
Imports (volume index, base year 2002 = 100)
GDP AND BUSINESS SURVEY INDICATOR
INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY
FOREIGN TRADE
CHART 2  CYCLICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ACTIVITY
  (seasonally and calendar adjusted data, unless otherwise 
stated)
Sources : DGSEI, NAI, NBB.


















































































































































Hours worked by person
Hourly labour productivity
Temporary work (1) (left-hand scale)









CHART 3  LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
  (seasonally adjusted data, unless otherwise stated)
Sources : EC, FEDERGON, NAI, NEO, NBB.
(1)  Thousands of hours worked by temporary agency workers.
(2)  Thousands of persons (concept of physical units), non-seasonally adjusted data.
(3)  Harmonised, percentages of the labour force.16
Table  3  Labour suppLy and demand













GDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 2.6 1.0 –3.5 –0.2
Volume of labour  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.0 1.2 –3.0 –0.8
Domestic employment (persons)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.8 1.6 –0.8 –1.8
(changes in thousands of persons)
Domestic employment   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 77.4 71.2 –36.5 –79.6
Employees  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50.8 69.4 64.1 –33.4 –74.0
of which : branches sensitive to the business cycle   . . . . . . . 35.4 53.7 44.7 –44.8 –85.2
Self-employed  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 8.0 7.1 –3.1 –5.5
Frontier workers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.1
Total employment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.6 78.4 71.8 –36.2 –79.5
Unemployed job-seekers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –8.1 –55.4 –27.6 67.8 111.1
Labour force  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.2 25.1 46.0 33.3 33.2
p.m. Harmonised activity rate  (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66.5 67.1 67.1 66.7 66.8
  Harmonised employment rate  (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.0 62.0 62.4 61.2 59.8
  Harmonised unemployment rate  (2)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 7.5 7.0 7.7 9.2
Sources : EC, NAI, NEO, NBB.
(1)  Percentages of the population of working age (15-64 years).
(2)  Percentages of the labour force.
 
continued to grow until the end of 2008, job losses are 
now  likely  to  exceed,  for  the  first  time  in  more  than 
five  years,  new  job  creations  from  the  first  quarter  of 
2009 onwards. The bulk of the job losses are nevertheless 
expected later in the year and at the beginning of 2010. 
All in all, 140,000 jobs are likely to be lost between the 
end of 2008 and the end of 2010.
The reduction in employment, together with an estimated 
growth of the labour force by 33,000 persons each year, 
will lead to a cumulative increase in the number of unem-
ployed job-seekers of 179,000 units over the two years 
covered by the projections. The average unemployment 
rate is forecast to rise from 7 p.c. in 2008 to 9.2 p.c. in 
2010. It is expected to reach 9.7 p.c. by the end of 2010.
Despite  this  recent  extension  to  white-collar  workers, 
these schemes only enable fluctuations in production to 
be cushioned temporarily. In view of the deep-seated and 
lasting nature of the downturn in activity, there is likely 
to be increasing evidence of a reduction in the number 
of people in employment over the course of 2009 and 
again in 2010. In parallel with the forecast 3.5 p.c. decline 
in GDP in 2009, the volume of employment, measured 
by the total number of hours worked in the economy, is 
projected to fall by 3 p.c. this year, and then by 0.8 p.c. in 
2010. In turn, the drop in the number of persons in paid 
employment is expected to be no more than 0.8 p.c. in 
2009, before rising to 1.8 p.c. the following year, giving 
net losses of respectively 36,000 and 80,000 jobs as an 
annual average. While the number of persons employed 17
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Box 2  –  Could the recession affect the economy’s potential growth path ?
Whether the current crisis may or may not have a permanent impact on economic growth is a crucial question for 
future prosperity. The present projections indicate a hesitant growth revival during 2010, though growth will be 
well below its average rate, and nowhere nearly strong enough to compensate for the contraction in economic 
activity recorded in 2009. Such a slow recovery suggests that the crisis could also depress economic growth in the 
longer term.
The long-term growth projections are based on potential growth, i.e. the maximum growth attainable using the 
available production factors – capital and labour – and the total productivity of those factors in the production 
process, without generating tensions on the product and labour markets. In the short term, there might be a 
discrepancy between potential growth and the figure actually recorded, constituting the output gap. At present 
that gap is decidedly negative. On the basis of that situation, two scenarios are possible : either the economy 
regains the potential growth path prevailing prior to the crisis, a scenario which would require an economic boom 
lasting several years (scenario A), or the crisis depresses potential growth (scenario B), thus putting a permanent 
brake on the rise in the standard of living.
Previous episodes have indicated that recessions often tend to impair the economy’s potential growth as a result 
of the indirect effects which the fall in demand exerts on total supply via various channels : via the production 
factor labour, by generating higher structural unemployment, via a slower accumulation of capital, and finally via 







































































































































SCENARIO A: POTENTIAL GROWTH UNCHANGED AFTER 2008 (1)
(actual GDP in 2008 = 100)
SCENARIO B: POTENTIAL GROWTH IMPAIRED AFTER 2008 (2)
(actual GDP in 2008 = 100)
Potential GDP Actual GDP
POTENTIAL AND ACTUAL GDP GROWTH SCENARIOS IN BELGIUM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MARKED DECLINE IN ACTIVITY
Source : NBB.
(1)  This chart shows the growth of actual GDP needed in order to close, over a four-year period, the negative output gap which emerged in 2009-2010, assuming that 
potential growth remains unchanged at 1.8 p.c. after 2008. In that case, actual annual GDP growth would have to average 3 p.c. from 2011.
(2)  This chart shows the growth of actual GDP needed in order to close, over a four-year period, the negative output gap which emerged in 2009-2010, assuming that 
potential growth drops to 1.1 p.c. from 2010. In that case, actual annual GDP growth would have to average 2 p.c. from 2011.18
witness the example of Japan since the early 1990s. The effect on potential growth depends on the scale of the 
recession and its characteristics. In that regard, the current recession calls for particular attention : first, it is the 
most severe recession since the end of World War II, and second, it is accompanied by a financial crisis which could 
have a direct effect on the supply side of the economy. Moreover, it should be noted that potential growth is also 
determined by factors unconnected with the crisis, such as the expansion of the labour force (labour supply), which 
is already likely in itself to act as a brake in the coming years, owing to population ageing.
The present projections forecast a marked rise in unemployment, which is likely to come close to the peak seen 
in the early 1980s. In the past, strong increases in unemployment, particularly during the 1970s, were largely 
structural in character : thus, the unemployment rate hardly declined at all, or only very gradually, when activity 
picked up, and exerted downward pressure on potential growth. Although the current rise in unemployment is 
smaller and the risk of such hysteresis effects may have diminished in Europe, owing to slower growth of the 
available labour supply and a more active labour market policy, the current crisis will pose a decisive test for the 
operation of the labour market. The labour supply will probably be less in line with demand, in view of the fairly 
marked decline in activity in certain branches, such as financial services and some industrial sectors. That situation 
could reinforce the structural character of unemployment. In that regard, a number of studies have indicated that 
Belgium is particularly vulnerable : the percentage of job seekers who have still not found suitable employment 
after one year is in fact significantly higher in Belgium than in the euro area (Hobijn and Sahin, 2007).  (1) The labour 
market policy has a key role to play here, particularly in regard to placement and training services.
It also seems that the current recession could affect potential growth via a slowdown in investment and hence 
weaker growth of the capital stock.
The sudden, sharp downturn in activity has depressed the capacity utilisation rate in manufacturing industry, taking 
it to a record low of 70.1 p.c. in April 2009. That decline suggests that, even given a significant rise in activity, 
firms will show little readiness to increase their capital stock. In some ways, that situation might correspond to a 
correction of possible excess investment in the past. The financial crisis could augment the downward pressure 
on investment via increased risk premiums or by financial institutions tightening the other lending conditions 
which drive up the cost of capital. Existing investments would then be less swiftly replaced by new ones, or part 
of the capital stock could become obsolete and therefore less productive. In particular, that scenario is plausible in 
branches of activity experiencing a substantial decline in the capacity utilisation rate.
Past observations indicate that the impact of the recession on total factor productivity (TFP) is uncertain. Thus, if 
the allocation process is disrupted in both the labour and capital markets, in an economy facing structural shifts, 
both between certain branches of activity and between the private and public sectors, that would have an adverse 
influence on productivity. Moreover, given the liquidity problems and the resulting rise in the debt ratio, the 
recession could inhibit corporate investment in R&D and government investment in education and infrastructure, 
a phenomenon which could in turn be amplified by tighter financing conditions. Conversely, the example of the 
three Nordic countries shows an increase in productivity following the financial crisis of the early 1990s (Haugh 
et al., 2009).  (2) That increase could be triggered by a creative destruction process, as the least productive firms 
disappear from the market, or by the implementation of essential structural reforms, a route more readily accepted 
in times of crisis.
The potential growth projections are subject to a margin of uncertainty : not only is short-term GDP growth still 
unknown, potential growth – which cannot be directly measured – also has to be calculated on the basis of 
statistical models. Therefore, bearing these points in mind and being guided by notable episodes from the past, it 
(1)  Hobijn B. and A. Sahin (2007), Job finding and separation rates in the OECD, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Paper, n° 298.
(2)  Haugh D., P. Ollivaud and D. Turner (2009), The macroeconomic consequences of banking crises in OECD countries, OECD, Working Paper 683.
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is unlikely that we shall see a return to pre-crisis potential growth. Thus, the Bank’s projections, estimated on the 
basis of a production function, indicate a deceleration of potential growth, down from around 1.8 p.c. in 2008 
to 1.1 p.c. in 2010. These percentages are very similar to those published by the Federal Planning Bureau and the 
EC, which expect potential GDP growth to decline to 1.2 and 1 p.c. respectively in 2010. According to the EC, 
potential growth is actually set to fall to 0.7 p.c. in the euro area, essentially because the volume of labour and the 
capital stock will be harder hit than in Belgium. Productivity growth there is expected to stabilise, as in Belgium, 
at around 0.4 p.c. However, since productivity is derived as a residual figure following estimation of a model, the 
figures must be treated with caution.
Although these estimates are open to question, they are vital for macroeconomic policy, which aims to encourage 
a return to potential growth, and for structural policy, which aims to stimulate that growth. The estimate of 
potential growth also influences the calculation of the public sector’s structural financing balance.
The indications that the current crisis could cause a permanent reduction in the growth potential of the Belgian 
economy reinforce the importance and urgency of instituting structural reforms, in accordance with the Lisbon 
agenda, with the aim of increasing productivity and achieving efficient, flexible product and labour markets, so 
as to be able to respond as flexibly as possible to the consequences of the crisis and the in-depth restructuring 
facing certain branches of activity and the financial markets. The initiatives aimed at expanding the use of labour 
must also continue, because permanently weaker growth would compromise the already impaired sustainability 




















Actual GDP growth  (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 –3.5 –0.2 2.1 –4.0 –0.1
Contribution to potential growth  (2)   . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.5 0.7 0.7
Labour  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 –0.2 –0.1
Capital  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.4
TFP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
p.m. Potential growth
  Federal Planning Bureau  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.2 1.2
  EC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.0 1.0
Sources : EC, Federal Planning Bureau, NBB.
(1)  Percentage annual changes.
(2)  In percentage points.
 
expected to decline from 2 percentage points in 2008 to 
–1.4 percentage point in 2009. The changes in stocks and 
in net exports are also set to depress growth, by 1.1 and 
1 percentage point respectively. In 2010, the contribution 
of net exports is projected at –0.3 percentage point, and 
that of the other components should be close to zero.
2.2  Main expenditure categories
The slump in global demand and the effects of the finan-
cial crisis have a major direct or indirect impact on the 
principal factors driving demand. Thus, the contribution 
of domestic demand excluding stocks to GDP growth is 20
Table  4  GDP anD the main exPenDiture cateGories












Final consumption expenditure of individuals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.0 0.8 –0.9 0.2
Final consumption expenditure of general government   . . . . . . . . 0.1 2.3 2.1 1.2 1.8
Gross fixed capital formation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 6.1 5.1 –5.2 –2.7
Housing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.9 1.3 1.0 –3.4 –2.7
General government  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –10.6 3.4 1.5 6.2 2.1
Enterprises   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 8.5 7.1 –7.1 –3.3
p.m. Total final domestic expenditure  (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.8 2.0 –1.4 0.0
Change in stocks  (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 0.1 0.0 –1.1 0.1
Net exports of goods and services  (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 –0.3 –1.0 –1.0 –0.3
Exports of goods and services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 3.9 2.1 –16.0 –2.3
Imports of goods and services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 4.4 3.3 –14.9 –2.0
GDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 2.6 1.0 –3.5 –0.2
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  Contribution to the change in GDP.
 
In Belgium, as in neighbouring countries, producers were 
hit  by  the  sudden  and  unprecedentedly  steep  decline 
in  foreign  demand  in  late  2008  and  early  2009.  That 
trend should moderate so that foreign markets will begin 
expanding again during 2010, albeit far more slowly than 
before the crisis. Overall, the volume of Belgium’s exports 
of goods and services is expected to contract by 16 p.c. in 
2009 and 2.3 p.c. in 2010. At the same time, the volume 
of imports is set to decline to a similar extent, by almost 15 
and 2 p.c. respectively. Actually, in the absence of support 
from domestic demand, the pattern of imports is largely 
dependent on the trend in exports, owing to the close 
international integration of the production chains.
The marked deterioration in global economic activity and 
in the demand outlook explains for a large part the sharp 
fall  in  business  investment  in  2009.  According  to  the 
quarterly  survey  of  manufacturing  industry,  the  capac-
ity  utilisation  rate  declined  steeply,  causing  many  firms 
to postpone their investment spending. Moreover, firms 
which nevertheless wish to invest face adverse develop-
ments affecting the financing of their projects. The fall in 
demand indeed has a negative impact on the capacity of 
firms to generate sufficient financial resources. Thus, after 
six years of sustained growth, the gross operating surplus 
of companies was 0.7 p.c. down in 2008 and is set to con-
tract by a further 5.5 p.c. in 2009. Although firms could 
take advantage of the fall in import prices to increase their 
gross operating margin per unit of sales, that would not 
be sufficient in itself to offset the negative effect of the 
decline in the volume of sales of around 10 p.c. Moreover, 
external funding became much more expensive in 2008, 
and  that  situation  will  only  improve  gradually  during 
2009. Although the banks are largely passing on to their 
customers the interest rate cuts introduced by the ECB, 
thus reducing the interest rates on bank loans to the low 
level recorded during the period 2003-2005, at the same 
time they are tightening the other credit conditions. The 
Eurosystem’s bank lending survey shows that the banks 
are demanding more collateral and granting smaller loans. 
The reason for this tightening is that the banks are taking 
account of an increased risk of default in the context of 
the current economic crisis. The banks have also tried to 
restrain their lending in response to their own balance 
sheet and liquidity problems. Issuance of listed shares and 
corporate bonds is also expected to remain considerably 
more  expensive  in  2009  than  before  the  outbreak  of 
the financial crisis, although some slight improvement is 
expected for these financing channels compared to the 
situation in 2008. The weighted average overall cost of 
external  financing  will  therefore  remain  relatively  high 
in 2009. All these negative factors should gradually dis-
appear  during  2010.  Thus,  both  foreign  and  domestic 
demand are expected to pick up little by little, the gross 
operating surplus of enterprises should increase, and the 
availability  and  cost  of  external  financing  are  expected 
to  return  towards  normal.  Nonetheless,  though  these 
movements could sustain corporate investment from mid-
2010, the annual growth of that investment is expected 
to remain negative at 3.3 p.c.21
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Although the contraction of investment in housing is less 
marked than the fall in corporate investment, the growth 
profile is broadly comparable. Notwithstanding the lower 
mortgage interest rates – due to rate cuts by the ECB 
and smaller margins applied by the banks – investment 
in housing this year is expected to be 3.4 p.c. below the 
2008 figure. That fall is due mainly to the limited growth 
in  the  nominal  disposable  income  of  households,  the 
adverse  employment  outlook  and  the  –  albeit  small  – 
reductions in prices expected on the secondary housing 
market. In 2010, the stagnation of the disposable income 
of  households  and  higher  mortgage  interest  rates  are 
likely to continue curbing investment in housing, leading 
to a negative growth figure of around 2.7 p.c.
The movement in private consumption expenditure also 
partly reflects the limited growth of household purchasing 
power. During the period 2008-2010, the real disposable 
income of individuals is expected to rise by only 0.3 p.c. 
as an annual average, compared to growth of 1.1 p.c. 
per  annum  during  1995-2007.  That  limited  increase  is 
actually largely due to the exceptionally low level of infla-
tion in 2009. In nominal terms, primary incomes will fall 
by 1.7 p.c. in 2009, as all the various components are 
affected by the deterioration in the economy. While the 
gross mixed incomes of self-employed persons will feel 
the effects of the downturn in activity, property incomes 
will be eroded mainly by the sharp fall in interest rates. 
Finally, the decline in workers’ remuneration will be due 
to the sharp reduction in the number of hours worked 
in 2009, since hourly labour costs will rise by a further 
2.6 p.c. However, the decline in primary incomes will be 
largely neutralised by the fact that individuals will pay less 
tax – thanks to a series of tax cuts approved at federal 
and regional level – and will receive more social benefits 
following  the  increase  in  the  numbers  of  unemployed 
or temporarily laid off. Thus, by allowing the automatic 
stabilisers to operate in full, the government cushions the 
impact of the economic crisis on individuals. In conjunc-
tion with overall inflation well below the level of income 
indexation  –  particularly  the  indexation  of  wages  and 
social benefits – the real disposable income of individuals 
should increase by 1 p.c. in 2009. However, it will not 
rise  further  in  2010.  In  particular,  the  deterioration  in 
the labour market is likely to continue depressing earned 
incomes  owing  to  both  the  decline  in  the  volume  of 
labour and a limited rise in hourly compensation. Property 
incomes will probably be underpinned by rising interest 
rates, and current net transfers to other sectors will con-
tinue to fall.
Generally speaking, the outlook for household incomes is 
uncertain in the medium term. In that context, consum-















































































































































CHART 4  MAIN EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES
  (non calendar-adjusted volume data, percentage changes 
compared to the previous year, unless otherwise stated)
Sources : ECB, NAI, NBB.
(1)  Seasonally adjusted data; percentage changes compared to the corresponding 
quarter of the previous year.
(2)  Calendar-adjusted data.
(3)  Excluding changes in stocks.
(4)  At current prices.



























CONSUMPTION, DISPOSABLE INCOME AND 
SAVINGS RATIO OF INDIVIDUALS
Disposable income (5)















BUSINESS INVESTMENT AND DETERMINANTS
Corporate investment
Final demand (3)
Gross operating surplus of companies (4)
EXPORT MARKETS AND EXPORTS OF GOODS 
AND SERVICES (1)22
Table  5  Gross disposable income of individuals, at current prices












Gross primary income  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 5.8 4.7 –1.7 0.5
of which :
Wages and salaries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 5.8 5.0 –0.6 –0.4
Remuneration per hour   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.6 3.7 2.6 0.6
Number of hours worked  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 2.1 1.2 –3.1 –1.0
Non-wage incomes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 5.8 4.0 –4.4 2.9
Current transfers to other sectors  (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 6.6 7.0 –14.1 –3.9
of which :
Current taxes on property incomes   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.1 3.9 7.4 –5.5 1.2
Gross disposable income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 5.6 4.2 1.1 1.3
p.m. In real terms  (2)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.8 –0.1 1.0 0.0
Consumption expenditure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 4.9 5.2 –1.1 1.5
Savings ratio  (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.9 13.7 12.7 14.6 14.5
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  These are net amounts, i.e. the difference between incomes or transfers received from other sectors and those paid to other sectors, excluding transfers in kind.
(2)  Data deflated by the private final consumption expenditure deflator.
(3)  Gross savings, as a percentage of gross disposable income, these two aggregates being taken inclusive of the change in the net claims of households on pension funds.
 
3.  Prices and costs
After  having  peaked  at  5.9  p.c.  in  July  2008,  infla-
tion  in  Belgium  rapidly  subsided,  dropping  to  0.7  p.c. 
in April 2009. It had thus reverted more or less to the 
level recorded for the euro area as a whole, whereas in 
mid-2008 it had exceeded that figure by 1.9 percentage 
points.  (1)
The  recent  moderation  in  the  rate  of  consumer  price 
rises, like the strong acceleration in the preceding twelve 
months, is largely due to the “energy” and “food” com-
ponents of the HICP. According to the projections, infla-
tion should continue to fall in the short term, thus becom-
ing negative for a time. This situation, likely to last for 
only a few months, is due mainly to base effects related 
with the record prices of petroleum products during the 
summer of 2008. According to the assumption adopted 
for the purpose of this exercise, the oil price will continue 
to increase gradually from its lowest level of 41.6 dollars 
per barrel of Brent, recorded in December 2008, since it 
stood at 55 dollars in May 2009 and is expected to reach 
68 dollars by the end of 2010, but these levels are still 
well below the peak of more than 140 dollars, recorded 
in July 2008.
(1)  In May, inflation was running at –0.2 p.c. in Belgium.
income in 2009 as a temporary windfall, and will take 
advantage  of  it  to  boost  their  savings.  This  increased 
propensity to save is also due to the fall in share prices 
since the summer of 2007. Although wealth effects have 
been relatively limited so far in Belgium, the decline in the 
net financial assets of individuals, caused by share prices 
plunging by around 60 p.c. between October 2007 and 
March 2009, will probably continue to exert substantial 
downward  pressure  on  consumption  in  2009,  because 
individuals  will  try  to  make  up  part  of  their  losses  by 
saving more and therefore consuming less. The savings 
ratio  is  therefore  estimated  to  increase  from  12.7  p.c. 
of disposable income in 2008 to 14.6 p.c. in 2009 and 
14.5 p.c. in 2010.
The growth of public consumption expenditure is expected 
to slow in real terms, to 1.2 p.c. in 2009, before regaining 
momentum in 2010 to reach 1.8 p.c. However, the recov-
ery projected for 2010 is due exclusively to a more favour-
able movement in prices. In nominal terms, the growth 
of public consumption is likely to continue to slow down. 
Public investment is predicted to increase substantially in 
2009, growing by 6.2 p.c. in real terms, before expanding 
by a further 2.1 p.c. in 2010. That pattern is entirely in line 
with the electoral cycle of public investment.23
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Once  these  base  effects  have  faded  away,  inflation  is 
expected to return to positive figures at the end of 2009, 
though remaining low up to the end of the projection 
period. In all, as an annual average, inflation is forecast 
at 0.1 p.c. in 2009 and 1.3 p.c. in 2010, having reached 
4.5 p.c. in 2008. The health index, used as the reference 
for the indexation of wages and social benefits, in par-
ticular, is projected to rise by 0.8 p.c. in 2009 and 1.1 p.c. 
in 2010.
The low inflation predicted up to the end of the projec-
tion period is mirrored in the expected movement in the 
prices of each of the two main components of the HICP, 
namely  non-energy  industrial  goods  and  services,  even 
though  inflation  in  these  two  product  categories  will 
initially be higher in Belgium than in the euro area as a 
whole. In general, the easing of underlying inflation is due 
to the rapid attenuation of inflationary pressure resulting 
from the widespread weakness of demand. That effect is 
exerted both via import prices, from 2009 onwards, and 
via domestic labour costs, principally in 2010. In particu-
lar, the import deflator is projected to fall by 3.1 p.c. in 
2009, before rising by 1 p.c. in 2010, driven mainly by 
the expected increase in commodity prices. Unit labour 
costs in the private sector are set to continue rising at a 
sustained pace of 2.9 p.c. in 2009, but should decline by 
0.1 p.c. in 2010.
This  marked  deceleration  in  unit  labour  costs  between 
2009 and 2010 is partly linked to the cyclical profile of 
labour productivity. As in the previous year, the sudden 
decline in activity will depress productivity in 2009, but 
the adjustment in the volume of labour mobilised by firms 
should gradually take effect in 2010. However, at 0.5 p.c. 
the  growth  of  hourly  productivity  is  likely  to  remain 
modest, in line with the hesitant revival of output.
The increase in hourly labour costs is projected to decline 
from 2.3 p.c. in 2009 to 0.4 p.c. in 2010, compared to 
an average annual rise of 3.6 p.c. in the preceding two 
years.  In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  central 
agreement for 2009-2010 concluded in December 2008, 
the  expected  movement  in  labour  costs  in  the  private 
sector takes account of indexation and the possibility of 
granting, in the context of negotiations at joint sectoral 
committee level, non-recurring bonuses of 250 euros per 
worker over the two-year period, of which 125 euros can 
be paid in 2009. The decision to allow the granting of 
such a bonus, which will attract favourable tax treatment, 
rather than setting an indicative norm for a permanent 
rise, is due to the need for wage negotiations to take 
account  of  the  sharp  decline  in  competitiveness  and 
the  deterioration  in  the  labour  market.  Moreover,  that 
deterioration is likely to increase the level of redundancy 
payments  and  to  lead  to  an  endogenous  reduction  in 
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CHART 5  INFLATION
  (HICP, percentage changes compared to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Sources : EC, NBB.24
Table  6  Price and cost indicators












HICP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 1.8 4.5 0.1 1.3
Health index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.8 4.2 0.8 1.1
Underlying inflation  (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.9 2.7 2.0 1.0
Labour costs in the private sector :
Labour costs per hour worked   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.7 3.5 2.3 0.4
p.m. Including the effects of the reductions in payroll tax  (2)   . . 2.8 3.4 3.2 2.0 0.0
Employers’ social contributions  (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.3 0.4 –0.2 0.2 0.1
Gross wages per hour worked   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.4 3.7 2.1 0.3
of which : indexation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.7 2.9 2.4 0.5
p.m. Labour productivity  (4) 1.6 0.6 –0.4 –0.5 0.5
Unit labour costs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 3.1 3.9 2.9 –0.1
Sources : EC ; FPS Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue ; NAI ; NBB.
(1)  Measured by the HICP excluding unprocessed food and energy.
(2)  This refers to payroll tax reductions granted to firms in the private sector. According to the national accounts methodology, they should be recorded as a subsidy  
and not as a direct reduction in charges. They therefore cannot be taken into account for calculating labour costs.
(3)  Contribution to the change in labour costs resulting from changes in the implicit contribution rates, percentage points.
(4)  Value added in volume per hour worked by employees and self-employed persons.
 
average individual wages, particularly via lower bonuses 
or the departure of highly-paid staff. In order to offset 
part  of  the  wage  handicap,  the  payroll  tax  reductions 
granted  to  firms  have  been  extended.  Although  they 
help to reduce labour costs, these measures are consid-
ered  as  subsidies  rather  than  as  reductions  in  charges 
according to the conventions of the national accounts ; 
in  that  sense,  they  do  not  influence  the  labour  costs   
considered here.
4.  Public finances
4.1  Overall balance
According to the provisional figures published by the NAI 
in March 2009, Belgium’s public finances recorded a defi-
cit of 1.2 p.c. of GDP in 2008. That deficit is expected to 
reach 5.5 p.c. of GDP in 2009 and 6 p.c. in 2010.
The  sharp  deterioration  in  the  public  deficit  and  the 
upward  revision  of  the  figure  compared  to  the  Bank’s 
previous projections are due to the macroeconomic envi-
ronment described above, which is now being seen as far 
more adverse. In order to avoid exacerbating the deterio-
ration in the economy, the federal government decided 
to allow the automatic stabilisers to respond to the reper-
cussions of the crisis. In other words, neither the negative 
effects of the current severe recession on public revenues 
nor the upward pressure on unemployment expenditure 
are being neutralised.
Moreover, the federal government and the regional gov-
ernments have drawn up economic recovery plans in line 
with the European Economic Recovery Plan, approved by 
the European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008. They 
comprise measures intended essentially to counteract the 
fall in demand. In Belgium, the scale of the recovery meas-
ures is relatively modest, as the high level of the tax burden 
and the public debt and a clearly increasing deficit narrow 
the available scope for action. The measures designed to 
safeguard corporate financing and investment are addi-
tional components of the recovery plans.
The interest charges of general government are projected 
to increase slightly in 2009, for the first time since 1990. 
That  situation  is  due  solely  to  the  strong  expansion  of 
public debt in 2008, which will probably continue to rise 
over the next two years. However, the effect of the rise 
in public debt is attenuated to some extent by the fall in 
the average implicit interest rate applicable to it, caused 
mainly by the extremely low level of short-term market 
interest rates.
In  regard  to  non-recurrent  factors,  two  court  decisions 
calling on the Belgian government to refund certain taxes 
are likely to increase the budget deficit in 2009. According 25
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to the ESA 95 methodology, these refunds, which concern 
corporation tax and personal income tax and amount to 
around 0.5 p.c. of GDP, are recorded as capital transfers. 
In 2009 there will also be a one-off reduction in public 
revenues owing to the small, temporary cut in the rate of 
VAT on new housing construction, specified in the federal 
recovery plan. The projections do not include any major 
non-recurrent factors in relation to 2010.
It should be noted that the projections only take account 
of budget measures which have already been announced 
and specified in sufficient detail. They disregard the effect 
of decisions yet to be taken, e.g. when the 2010 budget 
will  be  drawn  up.  The  April  2009  stability  programme 
assumes  a  return  to  a  balanced  budget  in  2015.  The 
present projections show that a major consolidation pro-
gramme will be needed to achieve that aim.
4.2  Revenues
Expressed as a percentage of GDP, public revenues are set 
to fall by 0.3 p.c. of GDP in 2009 and to increase slightly 
by 0.2 p.c. of GDP in 2010.













Revenues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48.7 48.1 48.7 48.4 48.6
of which : fiscal and parafiscal revenues   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43.8 43.3 43.7 43.0 43.0
Primary expenditure   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44.5 44.5 46.2 50.0 50.7
Primary balance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 3.6 2.5 –1.6 –2.1
Interest charges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.9
Overall balance   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –0.2 –1.2 –5.5 –6.0
p.m. Stability programme targets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.3 0.0 –3.4 –4.0
Sources : FPS Finance, NAI, NBB.
(1)  According to the methodology used in the excessive deficit procedure (EDP).
 
Table  8  Structural meaSureS relating to public revenueS






Taxes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1,236 –116
of which :
Tax reduction granted by the Flemish Region  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –553 0
Increase in the tax-free allowance for workers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –150 75
Increased allowance for energy-saving investments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –273 0
Introduction of the housing bonus  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –154 0
Tax-favorable wage increases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –113 –113
Increases in excise duty on petrol and diesel   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 0
Other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –75 –78
Social security contributions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –170 –100
total  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1,406 –216
p.m. Percentages of GDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.4 –0.1
Sources : Budget documents, FPS Finance, NSSO.
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The decline in revenues expected in 2009 is due mainly to 
structural measures, the effects of which should amount 
to 0.4 p.c. of GDP. Thus, levies on earned incomes will be 
reduced by the introduction in 2009 of a general lump 
sum  reduction  in  personal  income  tax  granted  by  the 
Flemish Region to its residents, the increase – effective 
from 1 July 2008 – in the tax-free allowance for low and 
medium incomes, and the raising of the percentages and 
the  ceiling  of  the  standard  allowance  for  professional 
expenses. In addition, in 2009 the impact of the increase 
in the tax allowance for energy-saving investments and 
the introduction of the housing bonus system is reflected 
in the personal income tax assessments. Conversely, the 
revenues generated by excise duties on mineral oils should 
rise following the reintroduction of the ratchet system for 
diesel and petrol.
Overall, the impact of the economic recovery plans on 
revenues is fairly modest. For the government, the decline 
in revenues is due partly to the award of pay increases 
in  a  tax-favourable  way,  amounting  to  a  maximum  of 
250 euros per person over 2009 and 2010 as a whole, 
including a maximum of 125 euros in the first year, laid 
down in the central agreement, and partly – during the 
whole of 2009 – to a temporary reduction in the VAT rate 
from 21 to 6 p.c. for new housing construction, applicable 
to the first 50,000 euros.
The  federal  government  has  also  adopted  a  series  of 
measures  aimed  at  improving  the  liquidity  position  of 
firms and self-employed persons. Thus, employers have an 
additional three months in which to hand over the payroll 
tax normally due in March to August 2009. In addition, 
in 2009, it will be easier for firms and self-employed per-
sons facing liquidity problems to obtain more time to pay 
their social contributions and VAT. The system whereby 
the government pays VAT refunds monthly has also been 
extended. Since these measures simply lead to postpone-
ment of the levy or payment, they have no direct effect 
on the government’s budget balance.
4.3  Primary expenditure
Primary expenditure which, as a percentage of GDP, had 
already risen sharply in 2008 to 46.2 p.c., should expand 
very significantly in 2009 and 2010, to 50 and 50.7 p.c. 
respectively. This surge is due partly to the fall in the level 
of  nominal  GDP  compared  to  2008,  and  partly  to  the 
sustained growth of primary expenditure.
Part of the reason for that growth lies in non-recurrent 
or cyclical factors, relating to the effects of the crisis, for 
instance,  and  the  economic  recovery  objectives.  Thus, 
unemployment expenditure acts as an automatic stabiliser. 
Its cyclical component will have an impact on the growth 
of real primary expenditure amounting to 0.2 percentage 
point in 2009 and 0.5 point in 2010. Other factors, such 
as the temporary scheme for suspending execution of the 
employment contract, enabling employees to qualify for 
an allowance, apply for a limited time. Also, the delayed 
effect of inflation – i.e. the effect in a full year which the 
indexation of 2008 wages and social benefits will exert on 
expenditure in 2009 – is also likely to fuel the increase in 
real expenditure.
Deflated by the HICP and adjusted for the influence of 
the economic cycle, non-recurrent factors and indexation 
effects, primary expenditure is projected to increase by 
2.8 p.c. in 2009 and 2.4 p.c. in 2010, rates comparable 
to the average for the past ten years but well above the 
trend growth of GDP.
The increase in expenditure – adjusted for these various 
factors – projected for 2009 is the outcome of divergent 
developments in the subsectors which make up general 
government.  At  federal  government  level,  the  increase 
will be considerably smaller than in recent years. A new 
wave  of  employment-creating  measures,  such  as  the 
general reduction in payroll tax, recorded as subsidies in 
accordance with the ESA 95, will affect the growth of 
primary  expenditure  to  a  greater  extent  than  in  2008. 
However, that effect is likely to be more than offset by 
the  decline  in  the  growth  of  purchases  of  goods  and 
services. At the same time, the already sustained expan-
sion  of  social  security  expenditure  is  set  to  accelerate 
further owing to the expected rise in expenditure under 
the service voucher system, and the rise in spending on 
health care, pensions and unemployment benefits. These 
last two expenditure categories are likely to be influenced 
in particular by a set of measures adjusting benefits in line 
with prosperity. In contrast, in the case of the communi-
ties and regions and the local authorities, the increase in 
expenditure should be fairly moderate.
Since no budget is available at present, it is difficult to 
estimate the rate of increase in primary expenditure in 
2010. However, the projections already take account of 
a  set  of  measures  aimed  at  increasing  social  benefits : 
these will drive up social security expenditure to a lesser 
extent than in 2009. The growth of federal government 
expenditure is likely to be particularly strong, one reason 
being the arrival at maturity of the measures approved so 
far concerning the reduction in payroll tax. In the case of 
the communities and regions, these projections are largely 
based on movements seen in the past, adjusted to take 
account of the influence of the electoral cycle at this level 
of power on investments, which are likely to decline. Local 27
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authority  expenditure  is  expected  to  revert  to  growth 
close to its trend rate, owing to a relatively strong invest-
ment revival.
4.4  Debt
Between 1993 – the year when public debt peaked at 
133.5 p.c. of GDP – and 2007, the general government 
debt ratio declined steadily by an average of 3.5 percent-
age points per annum, mainly as a result of endogenous 
factors such as the primary surplus, the reduction in the 
implicit  interest  rate  on  public  debt,  and  the  growth 
rate of the economy. At the end of 2007, it represented 
84 p.c. of GDP. The gap between Belgium’s debt ratio and 
that of the euro area thus contracted from 68 percentage 
points in 1993 to 18 points in 2007.
Since then, the trend has been reversed, and public debt 
has begun rising again. In 2008, it increased by 5.7 per-
centage points, owing to exogenous factors, mainly the 
capital injections and credit granted to financial institu-
tions in the context of the crisis afflicting the sector. Since 
the  financial  crisis  affected  Belgium  more  severely,  and 
sooner, than the euro area as a whole, the surge in the 
public debt ratio was more marked here.
In 2009 and 2010, the general government debt is pro-
jected to record a further strong increase, albeit slightly 
below  the  average  for  the  euro  area.  The  main  fac-
tors behind that increase will be endogenous changes, 
due to the expected budget deficits and – especially in 
2009 – to the contraction of GDP. At the end of 2009, 
the debt ratio is projected at 97.4 p.c. of GDP. In 2010, it 
is likely to increase further to 103 p.c. of GDP.
5.  Assessment of the risk factors
In  all  respects,  not  only  the  global  economy  but  also 
the economy of the euro area and that of Belgium are 
experiencing a period of particular uncertainty. The eco-
nomic  agents,  governments  and  monetary  authorities 
face an unprecedented situation in which the effects of 
their  actions  are  difficult  to  predict.  For  them  and  for 
the forecasters, too, it is mainly a question of monitoring 
developments day by day and adjusting their assessment 
accordingly.
Despite  the  great  uncertainty  surrounding  the  current 
economic  situation,  the  Bank’s  figures  are  similar  to 
recent forecasts issued by other institutions, in terms of 
both  activity  growth  and  inflation.  However,  it  is  vital 
to be aware of the risk factors which could affect those 
projections.
Thus, the risk of the financial tensions spreading to the 
real economy, mentioned when the previous projections 
were published, has materialised in dramatic form in the 
past six months, with totally unexpected speed and sever-
ity. One might hope that the worst is over in terms of 
the rate of the contraction in demand, that hope being 
based in particular on the stabilisation of certain indica-
tors which usually act as early signals. However, it remains 
to be seen whether that early indication will also prove 
correct in the current context, or whether this time those 
positive signs will prove false, as owing to its depth and 
synchronisation in the main economies, the recession will 
induce a lasting adjustment of employment and invest-
ment, which will restrain the revival of domestic demand. 
Also, financial institutions are generally still under stress, 
and the direct effects of the financial crisis are now being 
compounded by the effects of the deteriorating economic 
situation, as is evident from the rising number of bank-
ruptcies. These factors were included in the projections, 
but it is particularly hard to quantify the scale and dura-
tion of their effects.
According  to  past  observations,  beyond  the  temporary 
effect resulting from the recent movement in prices of 
petroleum products, the Bank’s projections for Belgium, 
like  those  produced  by  the  Eurosystem  for  the  euro 
area, show a degree of persistence in inflation and wage 
growth. The widespread weakness of demand is therefore 
not likely to lead to deflation. That conclusion is based in 


























































CHART 6  CONSOLIDATED GROSS DEBT
  (percentages of GDP)
Sources : EC, NAI, NBB.
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Table  9  Comparison of the foreCasts for Belgium






















NBB – Spring 2009  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3.5 –0.2 0.1 1.3 –5.5 –6.0 June 2009
p.m. February 2009   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.9 – 0.5 – –3.3 – February 2009
Federal Planning Bureau (FPB)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3.8 –0.0 0.5 1.7 –4.3 –5.6 May 2009
IMF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3.8 0.3 0.5 1.0 –4.7 –5.6 April 2009
EC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3.5 –0.2 0.3 1.2 –4.5 –6.1 May 2009
Belgian Prime News  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2.4 0.8 0.7 1.4 –3.3 –3.9 March 2009
Consensus Economics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3.0 0.1 0.6 1.4 – – May 2009
Economist’s Poll  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3.0 0.2 0.6 1.4 – – May 2009
p.m. Actual figures 2008  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 4.5 –1.2
(1)  HICP, except FPB : private final consumption deflator.
(2)  Percentages of GDP.
 
in the central rates and the extension of the granting of 
liquidity  to  prevent  inflation  expectations  from  sinking 
too low.
The scale of the recession also raises questions regarding 
the long-term outlook. Thus, the measures introduced by 
the monetary authorities and governments are essential 
at this stage to restore the financial system and cushion 
the decline in activity, but they will have to be reassessed 
when the economic situation starts to improve, in order to 
avoid causing unwelcome levels of inflation and to retain 
control over public finances. In addition, the potentially 
adverse  effects  of  the  recession  on  long-term  growth 
must be minimised by measures designed to restore pro-
ductivity and ensure that a group of the population is not 
permanently excluded from the labour market.29
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Annex
Projections for the Belgian economy : summary of the main results













GDP in volume  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 2.6 1.0 –3.5 –0.2
Contributions to growth :
Domestic expenditure, excluding change in stocks   . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.8 2.0 –1.4 0.0
Net exports of goods and services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 –0.3 –1.0 –1.0 –0.3
Change in stocks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 0.1 0.0 –1.1 0.1
Prices and costs
Harmonised index of consumer prices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 1.8 4.5 0.1 1.3
Health index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.8 4.2 0.8 1.1
GDP deflator   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 2.4 1.7 1.1 1.1
Terms of trade  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.7 0.5 –2.8 1.0 0.1
Unit labour costs in the private sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 3.1 3.9 2.9 –0.1
Hourly labour costs in the private sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.7 3.5 2.3 0.4
Hourly productivity in the private sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 0.6 –0.4 –0.5 0.5
labour market
Domestic employment  
(annual average change in thousands of units)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 77.4 71.2 –36.5 –79.6
Total volume of labour  (1)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 2.0 1.2 –3.0 –0.8
Harmonised unemployment rate  (2) (p.c. of the labour force)  . . . 8.3 7.5 7.0 7.7 9.2
incomes
Real disposable income of individuals   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.8 –0.1 1.0 0.0
Savings ratio of individuals (p.c. of disposable income)  . . . . . . . . 12.9 13.7 12.7 14.6 14.5
Public finances  (3)
Overall balance (p.c. of GDP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –0.2 –1.2 –5.5 –6.0
Primary balance (p.c. of GDP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 3.6 2.5 –1.6 –2.1
Public debt (p.c. of GDP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87.9 84.0 89.7 97.4 103.0
current account 
(p.c. of GDP according to the balance of payments)  . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 1.7 –2.5 –2.4 –2.5
Sources : EC, DGSEI, NAI, NBB.
(1)  Total number of hours worked in the economy.
(2)  Adjusted series (Eurostat).
(3)  According to the methodology used in the excessive deficit procedure (EDP).
 